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We study the effects of bureaucratic corruption on fiscal policy and economic growth, 
where corruption (i) reduces the tax revenue raised from households, (ii) inflates the 
volume of government spending, and (iii) reduces the productivity of ‘effective’ 
government expenditure. We distinguish between the policies pursued by (a) a non-
optimising, and (b) an optimising government. For both cases, corruption leads to higher 
income tax and inflation rates and a lower level of government spending, thus hindering 
growth. In the circumstances, an activist government could allocate its resources in 
attempting to reduce the type of corruption that harms growth the most. Finally, the 
findings from our unified framework could rationalise the sometimes conflicting 
empirical evidence on the impact of corruption on growth in the literature. 
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Corruption was deemed “Public Enemy Number One” in developing countries by the 
World Bank Group President, Jim Yong Kim, on December 19, 2013. One of the key 




 This clearly underlines the World Bank’s awareness of corruption, via the 
activities of unscrupulous public officials, as a pervasive evil, and of its commitment to 
fight this menace. In this paper, we explore the channels through which corruption could 
thrive within a bureaucracy, and investigate the ways in which a government could 
attempt to offset this via the appropriate use of its policy instruments. 
 The pernicious effects of corruption on growth are well-acknowledged, although a 
strand of the literature argues that corruption could have some beneficial effects.
2
 A 
number of questions on the topic of corruption have evolved over the years and evoked 
genuine interest among academics as well as policymakers, and many of these critical 
questions centre around the public finance aspects of a government.
3
 How can the impact 
of corruption via the expenditure and revenue sides of the government budget constraint 
be captured, and is this sizeable enough to influence the macroeconomy? How do 
governments design appropriate spending and tax policies to moderate the effects of such 
corruption? Do the economic outcomes differ significantly when, in the presence of 
corruption, a government takes an active fiscal stance (by optimally choosing its policy 
instruments), instead of adjusting its instruments to ensure a balanced budget? In this 
paper, we provide answers to these types of questions through a unified approach linking 
bureaucratic corruption,
4
 fiscal policy and growth within an endogenous growth 
framework, given that such issues have rarely been addressed within the same framework 
in the related literature. 
There is no dearth of studies analyzing corruption within a general equilibrium 
framework. In early contributions, Barreto (2000) and Ellis and Fender (2006) explain the 
endogenous presence of corruption by assuming that the government is self-interested, 
                                               
1 See, for instance, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/12/19/corruption-developing-
countries-world-bank-group-president-kim. Earlier in 1996, and in the same vein, the former World Bank 
President, James D. Wolfensohn, had publicly declared corruption as a “cancer”. 
2 The efficiency or “speed money” hypothesis (see Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Lui (1985), etc.) has 
largely been overturned in the literature by the inefficiency argument of corruption via rent-seeking 
activities, barriers to innovation, adoption of  inefficient technologies, etc. (see, for example, Krueger 
(1974), Murphy et al. (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Sarte 
(2000), and Svensson (2005)). 
3 See Hillman (2004) for an IMF perspective on how corruption makes public finance ineffective in 
promoting economic development. 
4 Bureaucratic (or “petty”) corruption occurs when bureaucrats running the administration are corrupt, as in 
this paper, and the government is benevolent; while with “grand” corruption, the government itself is 
corrupt. (See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for a distinction.)  
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rather than benevolent. In Barreto (2000), the government has a natural monopoly over 
the provision of public goods, so that in the absence of corruption the public sector 
provides such goods at the marginal cost, achieving Pareto equilibrium. The author shows 
that a self-seeking government, with its representatives (the public officials), exploits the 
monopoly power that it has over the provision of public goods, so that less public goods 
are provided at higher prices relative to the competitive scenario. The public sector's 
monopoly profits represent the endogenous level of corruption within the economy, while 
limitations on the extent of corruption depend on the ability of the private sector to exert 
control over government activity.
5
 In a similar spirit, Ellis and Fender (2006) introduce 
endogenous corruption into a variant of the Ramsey model, where a government taxes 
private producers and uses the resources to either provide public capital or consume 
them, the latter constituting grand corruption. Due to the introduction of a time lag in the 
production process of public capital, the detection of corruption is not immediate and 
provides the government an incentive for appropriating public funds, which in turn gives 
rise to a level of irreducible corruption in the economy. The predictions accord well with 
the existing empirical evidence on the links amongst corruption, public investment, and 
the level and growth rate of output, while they also explain the observed features of the 
time paths of corruption. 
 More recently, Ivanyna et al. (2016) use a model to study the interaction among 
corruption, tax evasion and fiscal policy, all endogenously determined. In the model, the 
average level of government corruption affects households’ willingness to evade taxes 
and an official’s inclination to be corrupt. Tax evasion, in turn, affects corruption by 
restricting the amount of funds that can be raised by the government. Based on these 
assumptions, corruption tends to force the tax rate up because corrupt officials want to 
divert some government revenue earmarked for investment for their own private use, 
while tax evasion tends to force the tax rate down because evasion lowers the 
government’s ability to raise revenue at higher tax rates. The authors find that when the 
model is calibrated to match typical tax evasion levels found in developing countries, the 
net tax rate is significantly higher than in a baseline model with no corruption and 
                                               
5 Mauro (2004) and Litina and Palivos (2016) extend the idea of endogenous levels of corruption by 
developing models with multiple self-fulfilling equilibria where different levels of corruption can emerge 
based on the existence of strategic complementarities. 
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evasion. The rise in corruption lowers the government revenue that is actually invested in 
public capital, and the rise in the tax rate reduces private investment and worker 
productivity. However, the drop is not large, which could explain the difficulty in 
establishing a statistically significant correlation between corruption and growth in cross-
country studies. 
Our analysis complements and is most closely related to two recent contributions, 
by Myles and Yousefi (2015) and Ivanyna et al. (2015). Myles and Yousefi (2015) 
explore whether the positive correlation between corruption and inflation, as revealed by 
cross-section data, can be explained by an optimizing government using seigniorage to 
compensate for tax revenue lost to corruption. Three forms of corruption are considered: 
the reduction of effective tax burden, appropriation of tax revenue, and the appropriation 
of newly produced money. With a government choosing the monetary growth rate to 
maximize its social welfare function, the authors show that an increase in (any form of) 
corruption can raise monetary growth, the level of seigniorage, and subsequently the rate 
of inflation. Similarly focused on fiscal considerations, Ivanyna et al. (2015) study how 
the presence of corruption and tax evasion affects the way a country’s fiscal (especially 
public debt) policy is conducted. The authors focus on grand corruption and show that 
even when the other fundamentals of the (corruption-free) economy suggest that the 
optimal public debt level should be zero, the presence of corruption creates an incentive 
for public officials to enlarge budgets by raising tax rates and issuing public debt. The 
government debt resulting from corruption crowds out both private and public capital and 
significantly reduces output. 
In our paper, we assume a benevolent government, which either adjusts its fiscal 
instruments to ensure that its budget is balanced (“passive government”), or optimally 
chooses its instruments to maximise social welfare (“active government”). In the absence 
of ‘grand’ corruption, we introduce corruption in its ‘petty’ form, whereby only a fraction 
of bureaucrats is corrupt. These public officials by being self-interested, have an 
informational advantage over the government, a la Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), 
making it difficult for the latter to monitor them properly. Such informational asymmetry 
is a realistic feature of many countries, and in particular, among many developing 
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countries where corruption is rife.
6
 Within that set-up, corruption features in three distinct 
ways: On the expenditure side, there are two types of effects: first, corrupt officials 
inflate the size of the public spending, not for increasing the size of the national cake, but 
for their own pecuniary gain; secondly, although the amount of public spending is higher 
than warranted, the productivity arising out of such spending is considerably lower than it 
would otherwise have been.
7
 On the revenue side, corruption in tax administration 
implies that not all tax revenues end up in government coffers, as some of it is embezzled 
by corrupt bureaucrats involved in tax collection. Essentially, a bureaucracy which is 
more corrupt in every dimension will spend more money given a certain amount of public 
services, increase productivity by less given a certain amount of public services, and raise 
less money given a certain tax rate. Although some of these aspects have been captured in 
previous empirical papers (see Mauro (1995), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), among others), 
what has generally been missing is a formalization of all these channels through which 
corruption affects growth via the government budget constraint. We fill in this gap in the 
literature by deriving explicit analytical conditions to capture such effects, and 
supplement these with numerical simulations to assess the magnitude of the different 
types of corruption.  
That corruption may impact independently on both the expenditure and revenue 
sides of the government’s budget can be explained as follows: corruption can distort the 
composition of expenditures by shifting resources towards items where the possibility of 
inflating spending and obtaining more “commissions” is higher and also where there is 
greater scope for indulging in covert corruption, as alluded to by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993). Corruption can also alter the manner by which revenues are generated, e.g., by 
shifting from tax to seigniorage revenues when part of the tax proceeds does not accrue to 
the government and is usurped, as suggested by Imam and Jacobs (2007), and Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997, 2000), who find that corruption reduces total tax revenues by reducing 
the revenues from almost all taxable sources (including incomes, profits, property, and 
                                               
6 See Bardhan (1997) and Treisman (2000) on the link between corruption and development. 
7 Olson et al. (2000) attribute the cross-country differences in growth of total factor productivity (TFP) to 
differences in governance, but do not show any explicit theoretical link between (various forms of) 
corruption and growth as we do. In Del Monte and Papagni (2001), corruption does lower the quality of 
public infrastructure supplied to the private sector, but in their paper illegal behaviour manifests through 
bureaucrats providing the government with low quality goods at the same price as private markets and/or 
acquiring the same goods at a higher price. 
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capital gains). The implication is that, ceteris paribus, other means of raising income 
must be sought, and one of the most tempting of these is seigniorage. Significantly, it has 
been found that seigniorage is closely linked with inflation (see Cukierman et al. (1992)), 
and that inflation is positively related to the incidence of corruption (e.g., Al-Marhubi 
(2000)), while seigniorage, itself, has a negative effect on growth (e.g., Adam and Bevan 
(2005); Bose et al. (2007)). Such observations provide the motivation for this paper, 
which explores the influence of various forms of bureaucratic corruption on public 
spending and finance, and the implications of these for growth and development.
8
 
An important element of the model, which generates a link between inflation and 
growth, is provided by the presence of financial intermediaries who act on behalf of 
agents. Thus, agents hold money (in addition to capital) in their portfolio, and the 
portfolio allocation decision is made by those financial intermediaries. Following 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999, 2002), we consider a 
scenario in which individuals are subject to random relocation shocks that create a trade-
off between investing in a productive, but illiquid, asset (capital) and a non-productive, 
but liquid, asset (money). Intermediaries, which receive deposits from individuals, 
optimize this trade-off by choosing a composition of portfolio that depends on the 
relative rates of return of the two assets. An increase in inflation, which reduces the 
return on money, causes a portfolio re-allocation away from capital investment (loans to 
firms) towards greater cash holdings in order to guarantee adequate provision of liquidity 
services for those agents who are forced to relocate. As less funds are thereby available to 
invest in capital, this would be expected to have a depressing effect on growth.  
As regards the role of public policy in our paper, an innovation compared to the 
existing literature is that we consider first the case of a benevolent government which 
passively adjusts its revenues/expenditures (to ensure a balanced budget) in response to 
                                               
8 Although income taxation and seigniorage are both considered distortionary as regards growth, there is no 
consensus on the relative merits of tax versus money financing of public spending. For example, Palivos 
and Yip (1995) consider income-tax financing to be worse than inflation-tax financing, whereas De 
Gregorio (1993) generally holds the opposite view. Bose et al. (2007) link the optimal mode of financing to 
the levels of development, i.e., they find that for low-income (high-income) countries, financing 
expenditures with revenue generated by income taxation (seigniorage) is less distortionary for growth, and 
results that are similar in spirit are obtained also by Miller and Russek (1997), and Holman and Neanidis 
(2006). None of these papers, however, attribute corruption as a factor that affects the relative efficiency of 
seigniorage as against income taxation. 
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corruption, and then that of a government which chooses its instruments optimally to 
maximize a social welfare function comprising of the lifetime utilities of all honest agents 
over generations.
9
 We show that while the workings of the model are different in the two 
cases, their predictions are remarkably similar as to the choice of appropriate policy 
instruments and their respective growth effects, which implies that the issue of whether a 
government takes a passive or an active stance is actually not that critical. What is more 
important from a policy implication perspective is for an activist government to be able to 
get to grips with the quantitative effects of the different forms of corruption, and to 




In connection with the searching questions raised in the first paragraph, we find 
that in both the cases referred to above, corruption distorts growth by causing a lower 
level of government spending and higher rates of income tax and inflation. An interesting 
result is that, even though in our model corruption is generally harmful to the economy, 
there is a case where it may be beneficial for economic growth: this is when the 
government passively adjusts its level of expenditure (without adjusting revenues) in 
response to corruption; here corruption gives rise to non-monotonic growth effects. 
Typically, when a government is quite small, higher corruption requires an upward 
adjustment of the entire budget constraint and, thus, of public expenditure. This, in turn, 
raises productivity and economic growth. So, clearly, the effect of corruption on growth, 
and the direction of change in seigniorage and income taxes that is triggered, depends on 
the types of corruption that exist, and the different channels that are activated as a 
consequence. Thus, our results could provide a rationale for the empirical findings of 
papers that report the conditional (or non-monotonic) effects of corruption on growth, 
                                               
9 Note that corruption at an individual level is undetectable in our model. However, the overall distribution 
of corruption is known (and is, therefore, exogenously given in the aggregate). Consequently, an 
optimizing government, designing second-best fiscal policy, takes into account the welfare of all non-
corrupt agents. 
10 So, clearly, in both cases there is a link between central government policy and petty corruption, but this 
link is unidirectional. That is, the causality runs from corruption to fiscal policy (and subsequently growth). 
The model does not address reverse causality, running from fiscal policy, or any other type of government 
policy (such as, creation of anti-corruption government agencies), to corruption, because this is beyond the 
scope of our paper, the objective of which is to isolate the effects of corruption on growth via fiscal policy 
considerations. 
 8 
although we associate such non-linearity with the government budget and the government 
choices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
model, and characterizes the balanced growth path of the economy. Section 3 analyses 
the effects of corruption on the key economic variables when a government allows an 
exogenous adjustment of its fiscal instruments to ensure a balanced budget. Section 4 
captures the effects of corruption under an optimizing government. Finally, Section 5 
contains a few concluding remarks. 
 
2. The analytical model 
 
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which there is an infinite sequence 
of two-period-lived agents. Each generation of agents is comprised by private citizens (or 
households) and public officials (or bureaucrats). Households work for firms in the 
production of output, whilst bureaucrats work for the government in the administration of 
public policy. All agents work only when young and consume only when old.
11
 
Consumption is financed from savings with financial intermediaries that make optimal 
portfolio choices on behalf of agents by allocating their deposits between liquid and 
illiquid assets. This role of intermediaries is created by the existence of idiosyncratic 
relocation shocks which also motivate a demand for liquidity. This financial friction 
provides a link between the monetary and the real side of the economy. 
The government generates revenue by taxing labour income and by printing 
money (seigniorage), and undertakes expenditures on public goods and services along the 
lines of Barro (1990), where government spending is productive. Corruption takes shape 
in three different ways. Firstly, some bureaucrats appropriate tax revenues for 
themselves; secondly, some bureaucrats inflate the cost of public services; and thirdly, 
corruption reduces the efficiency of the public good in the production process.
12
 Finally, 
                                               
11 This assumption is found also in Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999, 2002), Bose et al. (2007), Blackburn et 
al. (2010), and Litina and Palivos (2016), among others. 
12 In our model, only (a fraction of) bureaucrats are corrupt. There is no tax evasion on the part of 
households, who are all honest and tax-compliant. This feature is different from Holman and Neanidis 
(2006), Ivanyna et al. (2016) and Litina and Palivos (2016), for instance, where a fraction of private 
household income is not reported for tax purposes. 
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firms, of which there is a unit mass, conduct all of their business in perfectly competitive 
product and factor markets. The economy is described in more detail as follows. 
 
2.1. Agents 
There is a constant population (normalised to one) of two-period-lived agents belonging 
to overlapping generations of dynastic families. Agents are divided at birth into a 
fraction, µ, of households and a remaining fraction, 1-µ, of bureaucrats.
13
 Both 
households and bureaucrats work only when young and consume only when old, deriving 








+= − > , (1) 
where ct+1 denotes old-age consumption. 
All young agents are endowed with the same unit amount of labour which is 
supplied inelastically to a given occupation (private employment or public service) in 
return for the same labour income of tw .
14
 This income is deposited as savings with 
financial intermediaries. As in Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999, 2002), we introduce some 
uncertainty into the model by assuming that a typical agent is born at a point in time in 
one particular location, where he resides in the first period of his life. In the second 
period, with probability q (0 < q < 1), this agent relocates to another location. The 
uncertainty of individuals about their future location is important for determining the 
composition of savings which can take two forms - a liquid, but unproductive, asset 
(money) and an illiquid, but productive, asset (capital). Although the return on capital is 
higher than that of money, there nevertheless exists some demand for cash as the latter is 
‘mobile’ because of its liquidity and is therefore demanded by agents who relocate. We 
                                               
13 As in Blackburn et al. (2006) and Sarte (2000), we abstract from issues relating to occupational choice 
and assume that agents are differentiated at birth according to their abilities and skills. This, in turn, means 
that households cannot choose to become bureaucrats, or vice-versa, even if they wish to take advantage of 
the illegal income opportunities available to the latter group of agents. 
14 This has a similar interpretation to the allocation of talent condition as in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), 
whereby the government is able to induce potential bureaucrats to take up public office by paying them 
salaries that they would earn elsewhere. Note that one does not need to invoke labour mobility across 
sectors to ensure this. Instead, the mechanism is that if an official accepts a salary less than tw , he is 
immediately identified as being corrupt and dismissed without pay, as in Blackburn et al. (2006), which 
means that all bureaucrats would refrain from accepting a wage other than tw . 
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assume that these shocks are identically and independently distributed across agents who 
prefer to save through intermediaries, rather than by themselves, because doing so allows 
them to exploit the law of large numbers in eliminating individual risk. We study this in 
detail in our subsequent analysis. 
 
2.2. Firms 
Households work for firms in the production of output. There is a unit mass of firms, 
each of which combines tl  units of labour with tk  units of capital to produce ty  units of 
output according to 
1[ (1 ) ]
t t t t
y Al k Gα β βξ χλ −= − , (2) 
( ))1,0(,,0 ∈> βαA , where tG  denotes productive public goods and services.  
 
We assume that expenditure on public goods and services is a fixed proportion of output, 
tt yG θ= , ( ))1,0(∈θ . The actual productivity of public goods and services, however, is 
less than what would have been in the absence of corruption. Specifically, as it is made 
clear in the next section, (1 )ξ χλ−  is the “effective” productivity of public spending, 
with χλ being the amount by which corruption reduces efficiency. This consideration is 
consistent with Bandeira et al. (2001) and Mauro (2004), where corruption reduces the 
productivity of effective public investment.15 
Given this, the firm maximises its profits by hiring labour at the real wage rate tw  
and renting capital at the real interest rate tr  so as to satisfy the condition of perfect 
competition in factor markets. Observe that equilibrium in the labour market requires 
tl µ= , so that with the use of tt yG θ= , equation (2) can be written as: 
,tt bky =  (2’) 
                                               
15 Corruption has also been found to diminish the productivity of private capital and total factor 
productivity. The former effect is illustrated by Lambsdorff (2003) while the latter by Dar and 
AmirKhalkhali (2002).  
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= , (3) 
brrt β== , (4) 
with equilibrium wages being proportional to the capital stock and the equilibrium 
interest rate being constant. 
 
2.3. Bureaucrats 
Bureaucrats work for the government in the administration of public policy. Specifically, 
public officials are divided into those that work on revenue collection (ν) and those that 
act in the procurement of the public good (1-ν). This means that ν(1-µ) bureaucrats 
collect revenues and (1-ν)(1-µ) procure public goods. The revenues collected by the 
bureaucrats are represented by a fixed proportional tax rate, )1,0(∈τ , the government 
levies on wage earnings, tw . The public goods and services procured by the bureaucrats 
have a real value tG  and, as described above, contribute to the efficiency of the firm’s 
output production. From the ν(1-µ) bureaucrats that collect revenues, we assume that (1-
η) are corrupt. We also assume that a fraction χ of the officials that procure the public 
good are also corrupt.
17
  
The above imply that on the revenue side, collected tax revenues by each 
bureaucrat correspond to )1(/ µντ −tw . However, only the non-corrupt among the 
bureaucrats involved in revenue collection bring the tax proceeds to the government. 
                                               
16 In our case, the use of an Ak-type technology can be justified by a number of reasons. First, it is possible 
to justify the absence of diminishing returns by considering a broad concept of capital. Second, research 
(e.g., Turnovsky, 2004) suggests that the growth effects of fiscal policy may be long-lasting, a feature 
consistent with the Ak model. Finally, it is often argued (e.g., in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) that in the 
presence of slow cross-country convergence, the growth effects in an Ak model provide a satisfactory 
approximation to the average growth effects over a long period in the neoclassical model. 
17 The distinction between corruptible and non-corruptible bureaucrats may reflect differences in 
proficiencies at being corrupt or differences in moral attitudes towards being corrupt (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Verdier (2000) and Blackburn et al. (2006)). At a secondary level, we also make a distinction as to the 
number of corrupt officials on the two sides of the government budget constraint: (1 ) (1 )η ν χ ν− ≠ − . 
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Hence, total tax revenues provided to the government by all non-corrupt officials are 
described by twητ . As a result, tax revenues appropriated by corrupt officials are given 
by twτη)1( − . On the spending side, each official is responsible for the procurement of 
)1)(1/( µνθ −−ty  public goods, which corresponds to the amount each non-corrupt 
official procures. Each corrupt official, on the other hand, artificially inflates public 
spending to an amount equal to 0),1)(1/()1( >−−+ εµνεθ ty . Here, ε represents the 
size by which spending is inflated due to corruption. Therefore, effective or total 
spending on public goods ( tg ) is given by public spending by non-corrupt bureaucrats 
plus that by corrupt bureaucrats, representing the first and second terms (after the first 
equality) respectively, of the expression below: 
.)1()1()1( tttt yyyg θχεθεχθχ +=++−=  (5) 
This means that actual spending on public goods increases due to corrupt practices as 
only tyθ  of total public spending is utilised in the firms’ production function. The 
remaining amount of tyχεθ  represents the illegal income (i.e., embezzlement) of corrupt 
bureaucrats. Such practices have been stressed empirically by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
who show that corruption inflates public capital expenditure, as the scope for indulging in 
corrupt practices is much higher for this type of spending. 
As mentioned in the previous section, corruption in our model also leads to a 
productivity loss, but only in the context of the procurement of public goods by corrupt 
bureaucrats. Specifically, we assume that each unit of the public good yields a 
productivity of ξ units when procured by (1-χ) non-corrupt bureaucrats, but only ξ(1-λ) 
units when this is procured by the χ corrupt bureaucrats. Therefore, the parameter 
)1,0(∈λ  captures the productivity loss of public spending due to corrupt practices.18 
Incorporating this aspect, we find that total productivity generated from public goods is 
                                               
18 Some of the typical channels through which corruption affects the productivity of capital are as follows: 
the lure of possible higher returns to rent-seeking activities could crowd out productive investment, as in 
Murphy et al. (1993). Romer (1994) contends that corruption, acting as a tax on profits, could thwart the 
adoption of new technology, particularly if an initial lump-sum payment has to be incurred. Also, there is 
considerable uncertainty concerning the enforceability of corruption contracts: enforcement costs are likely 
to be larger than regular contracts, and moral hazard is an issue, as pointed out by Boycko et al. (1995). 
This uncertainty is likely to result in lower investment and growth. 
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given by )1( χλξ − , as noted in the previous section. It is clear, therefore, that a higher 




The importance of (a high level of) productivity with which physical and human 
capital are used in contributing to output per worker has been stressed by Hall and Jones 
(1999). They contend that social infrastructure – which comprises of the institutions and 
government policies that make up the economic environment within which economic 
agents operate – contributes to the success on each of these fronts. They mention 
thievery, expropriation and corruption among the sources of “diversion” of social 
infrastructure. Recently, Faruq et al. (2013) have provided estimates of the negative 
effect of corruption on firm productivity in Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania: a one-standard-
deviation increase in corruption reduces firm efficiency between 15%-20%, depending on 
whether the firm is input- or output-oriented. Likewise, in our set-up, government 
procurement of public goods could be interpreted as contributing to social infrastructure 





A benevolent government provides public services, gt, that (partially) contribute to 
private productivity, as in Barro (1990), Chen (2006), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), etc. 
The government also pays bureaucrats’ salaries, which, as already described, earn the 
same salaries as that of households, wt. It follows then that the total real wage bill for the 
government is tw)1( µ− . The revenue side of the government’s budget constraint 
comprises seigniorage and tax receipts. The first term on the left-hand-side of equation 
(6) denotes real revenue from money printing or seigniorage (as in Myles and Yousefi, 
2015), while the second term gives the actual amount of tax revenue available to the 
government: 
                                               
19 One could consider the case where the corrupt procurers of public goods that inflate spending are 
different from the ones responsible for the productivity loss from public goods. This would, however, 
introduce some complexity into the model without delivering additional insights, which is why we have 
assumed there is one set of bureaucrats involved in the expenditure side of the government budget 
constraint. 
20 In its various forms, corruption has been modelled as a phenomenon that occurs with certainty. One 









− − , (6) 
where from (5) we need to assume that 1)1( <+ θχε  so as to place an upper limit to 
government spending as a fraction of output. 
In the analysis, we consider two different ways the government responds to 
corruption. First, we assume that the government allows for an exogenous adjustment of 
its fiscal instruments in order to ensure a balanced budget. We then consider the case 
where the government optimally chooses its instruments to maximize some social welfare 
function. The comparison between exogenous and endogenous fiscal policy adjustment 
gives us the opportunity to examine the extent by which the link between corruption and 
growth varies according to policy-making decisions. 
 
2.5. Financial intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries manage the savings of individuals and make portfolio allocation 
decisions in the interest of their depositors. The portfolio consists of money and capital, 
each of which has benefits and costs: money provides liquidity insurance for agents who 
are relocated, but does not pay any rate of interest; capital provides a rate of return for 
agents who do not relocate, but is unavailable to those who move. Individuals take the 
help of financial intermediaries – who are viewed as being formed as cooperatives from 
young households, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) – as the latter are able to exploit the 
law of large numbers and thereby to eliminate individual risk.
21
 Let δ (0 < δ < 1) be the 
fraction of deposits lent to firms (i.e. held in the form of capital), which implies that a (1-
δ) fraction is held in the form of money. Also, let it (It) denote the gross real rate of return 
paid to depositors who move (do not move) location. Finally, the variable, )( 1+≡ ttt PPR , 
which is the gross rate of deflation, denotes the real rate of return on money holdings, and 
is taken as given by the financial intermediaries. 
                                               
21 Instead of assuming that financial intermediaries operate as cooperatives drawn from households, one 
could consider such intermediaries as competing for the depositors, as in Bencivenga and Smith (1993). In 
that case, any (extra) economic profits that may accrue would be offered to depositors and therefore be 
competed away among the intermediaries, which in effect implies that competition leads to financial 
intermediaries acting in the best interests of depositors. 
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It ought to be noted that for households, as well as for non-corrupt bureaucrats, 
labour income (wt) is the only source of earnings. However, for corrupt public officials 
involved in revenue collection, twτη)1( −  is the amount appropriated illegally, while for 
the corrupt bureaucrats involved in public procurement, tyχεθ  represents the amount 
embezzled. We assume that these corrupt officials manage to escape punishment either 
because their actions are undetectable and/or governments find it difficult to implement 
punishment strategies due to resource constraints (which is true especially in developing 
countries). We also assume that whatever is embezzled by such officials is saved via 
“non-standard” channels: in other words, the usual mode of saving via financial 
intermediaries described above only applies to the legal component of the income of 
corrupt officials (i.e., labour income), but not to the funds embezzled while undertaking 
revenue collection and public procurement. If that would have been the case, then the 
offenders would be exposed with certainty.
22
 
The optimisation problem facing financial intermediaries involves choosing δt, it 
and It, so as to maximise the expected utility of a representative depositor 




















ttt Rqi )1( δ−= , (8) 
(1 ) t tq I rδ− = . (9) 
The financial intermediaries’ portfolio problem is to maximise the expected 
welfare of a depositor who deposits his entire labour income with them; and this 
depositor faces a probability, q, of being relocated (thereby receiving it), and a 
probability, 1-q, of remaining in the same location (thereby receiving It). This is given by 
equation (7) above. The resource constraint in (8) conveys the information that the 
financial intermediaries are able to meet the liquidity needs of the depositors who do 
                                               
22 This means that illegal income can be saved via “non-standard” channels, such as by being placed under 
the mattress, or being forwarded to an underground economy. In an open economy environment, they could 
also be transferred to foreign financial entities. As indicated, however, we abstract from these 
considerations because we can examine the effects of corruption without having to make any assumptions 
about the uses of these illegal funds. 
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relocate using their real money holdings, while (9) shows that the intermediaries are able 
to make the requisite payment (out of their lending to producers of capital) to the fraction 
of depositors who do not relocate. 
 In equilibrium, it is necessary that cash is dominated by capital in terms of rate of 
return, that is, .tt Rr >  Otherwise, lending to firms is not the preferred option. At the 
same time, this condition requires financial intermediaries to hold currency for the sole 
reason of meeting the liquidity needs of relocated agents.  
The solution of this problem yields the optimal share of deposits invested in 






















































δ , (10) 
where 0>∆ R , implying that a decrease in Rt, the return on money, induces 
intermediaries to allocate a larger fraction of deposits towards cash holdings. This is 
because in the presence of higher inflation (i.e., lower Rt), intermediaries find it difficult 
to provide sufficient liquidity for agents who relocate, unless they hold more money. This 
income effect of a change in inflation implies that more money needs to be held and a 




2.6. Balanced growth equilibrium 
Along the balanced growth equilibrium, which is unique and stable, all variables grow at 
the same rate. The growth rate is determined from the capital market equilibrium 
condition where the total demand for capital by firms, 1+tk , equals the total supply of 
capital by financial intermediaries, ttw δ  (which equals the investment in capital made by 
the intermediaries out of the deposits accruing from all agents). 
                                               
23 This result is by now standard in studies that use this modeling framework. See Espinosa-Vega and Yip 
(1999, 2002). 
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γ  (11) 
where γ is the economy’s equilibrium growth rate. From eq. (11), it is clear that γ  
responds positively to Rt. This is because a higher return on money (captured by higher 
Rt) eases the liquidity constraint for financial intermediaries, thereby enabling agents’ 
savings to be channelled towards capital, which spurs growth. 
Denoting t t tm M P≡  as the real value of money balances, we can express the 
money market clearing condition as )1()1( ttt wm δτ −−= , or using (3) and (10) obtain 










An increase in Rt (lower inflation) implies that lower money holdings are required to 
satisfy the liquidity demands of households who relocate, and this is reflected in eq. (12). 
Of course, in the steady-state, we have tttttt yymmkk /// 111 +++ ==≡γ . Using 
1t tm mγ −= , the government revenue from seigniorage can be expressed as 
γγ /)(/)( 1 tttt mRPMM −=− − . Then, combining equations (12) and (11) we obtain 
),(/)],(1[)(/)( 1 rRrRkRPMM tttt ∆∆−−=− − γ . 
Next, using the above expression for seigniorage, along with equations (2’), (5), 






























The first term on the left-hand-side of the above expression denotes the seigniorage 
revenue of the government. This seigniorage revenue is the product of the (productivity-
adjusted) inflation tax rate and the inflation tax base. The second term to the left of the 
equality is the tax revenue accruing to the government from the η-proportion of non-
corrupt tax collectors. The first term to the right of the equality is the spending on 
procurement of public goods (which includes the inflating of public expenditures by 
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corrupt bureaucrats), while the second term on the right-hand-side represents the salary 
payments made to bureaucrats, who comprise (1-µ)-proportion of the population. 
As our task is to understand the effects of corruption (in its different forms) on 
economic growth, and given that growth and fiscal instruments are jointly determined 
through the government budget constraint, we need to consider the simultaneous system 
described by equations (11) and (13). Accordingly, we need to take the total derivatives 
of equations (11) and (13). Doing so, yields 
,
)1()1(














































































































































































































We now use equations (11’) and (13’) to perform a number of comparative statics 
exercises, highlighting the role of the different aspects of corruption on the revenue and 
expenditure sides of the government’s budget, and eventually on growth. As already 
mentioned, the analysis distinguishes between the exogenous adjustment and the optimal 
choice of instruments by the government. These are described in the following sections, 
and enable us to obtain some interesting results. 
 
3. Corruption and growth in the decentralized equilibrium 
In this section, we examine the impact of the various forms of corruption (collection of 
tax revenue, procurement of public goods, and productivity of public goods) on growth 
by considering a passive stance by the government. That is, in response to corruption, the 
government is assumed to adjust its fiscal instruments to keep a balanced budget. To this 
effect, we examine independently the revenue generating and spending instruments. With 
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regard to the creation of public revenue, we examine three distinct cases: (i) only 
seigniorage can vary, (ii) only the income tax rate can vary, (iii) both revenue sources are 
allowed to vary. We finally consider the case where the government keeps its sources of 
revenue constant and allows only exogenous adjustments in public spending. 
 
3.1. Seigniorage as the single source of variation in government revenue 
Even though this may reflect an extreme case, the reliance of many countries (developing 
countries in particular) on seigniorage is a reality, often due to an inefficient tax system, 
making seigniorage a relatively inexpensive source of revenue (see Cukierman et al. 
(1992), De Gregorio (1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). In our model, this case 
amounts to setting changes in the rate of income tax equal to zero, 0dτ = , in equation 
(13’). This, in turn, implies that changes in seigniorage are used to match any changes in 
public spending (level effect), or compensate for any changes in tax revenue for a given 
level of government outlays (revenue composition effect). 
 Appendix A(I) illustrates how equations (11’) and (13’) look in matrix form under 
the above condition. It also shows how the gross rate of deflation (or inflation), R, and the 
rate of economic growth, γ, react to higher incidents of corruption as these materialise 
through the three different channels we consider. The results of these exercises take shape 
through the propositions below. 
 
Proposition 1: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and no fiscal consolidation 
(dτ = 0), an increase in corruption related with the (i) collection of tax revenue, (ii) 
procurement of public goods, or (iii) productivity of public goods, increases the rate of 
inflation and decreases the steady-state growth rate. 
 
Part (i) of the proposition reflects a negative effect of corruption on growth 
through changes in the composition of public revenue toward more seigniorage. This 
finding is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Blackburn et al. (2010) and 
the work of De Gregorio (1993). The former shows that a shift in the composition of 
public revenue toward more seigniorage at the expense of lower income taxes yields 
negative growth effects, while the latter highlights the role of an inefficient tax system 
 20
which due to high tax collection costs produces high inflation rates and low economic 
growth. The incidence of tax collection costs across countries has been documented by 
Bird and Zolt (2005), who report that developed countries devote roughly one percent of 
tax revenues to cover the budgetary costs of tax collection. The costs of tax 
administration for developing countries, on the other hand, are substantially higher–
almost three percent of tax revenues, according to Gallagher (2005). In our setup, the 
source of this inefficiency in tax administration arises out of corruption in the collection 
of public revenue. 
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 corresponds to a negative effect of corruption on growth 
through changes in the level of public revenue toward more seigniorage – for a given 
amount of revenue collected through taxation – due to an increase in effective public 
spending. At the same time, corruption diminishes the productivity of public spending 
which has a direct negative effect on growth. This result is in line with the empirical 
evidence provided by Adam and Bevan (2005) and Bose et al. (2007), who illustrate that 
greater reliance on seigniorage as a means of financing public expenditure generates 
distortionary effects on growth. 
This case represents an example of a situation where a particular type of 
corruption that operates on the expenditure side of the government budget constraint 
(manifested through a higher value of χ), affects the growth rate not only via inflated 
public spending, but also via shifts in revenues toward more seigniorage. Even though in 
both parts (i) and (ii) the outcome of higher corruption is lower economic growth, the 
difference is that in the former case the negative growth effect of a rise in seigniorage is a 
direct consequence of the fact that less tax revenues are generated (lower η). In the latter 
case, however, the growth effect (via higher χ) of higher seigniorage is indirect - 
strengthening the direct negative productivity effect on growth. 
In addition, both (i) and (ii) imply that higher corruption induces higher inflation 
as the government relies more on seigniorage, a result empirically confirmed by Al-
Marhubi (2000). Our contribution, therefore, lies in the fact that we identify two distinct 
channels via which corruption could lead to higher inflation: lower η (revenue side of the 
budget) or higher χ (expenditure side of the budget). 
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Part (iii) of Proposition 1 reflects the direct negative effect of corruption on 
growth via a decline in the productivity of public goods, and an indirect negative effect 
through changes in the composition of public revenue toward more seigniorage causing 
inflation to rise (decline in R) and the growth rate to fall. As regards the direct 
productivity effect, Salinas-Jimenez and Salinas-Jimenez (2007), by considering a sample 
of 22 OECD countries for the period 1980-2000, they show that corruption affects TFP 
growth, with economies that have lower levels of corruption recording, on average, faster 
growth rates. A similar result is obtained by Faruq et al. (2013) with regard to the adverse 
effect of corruption on the firm productivity of 900 African firms, and O’Toole and Tarp 
(2014) who identify a strong negative effect of corruption on capital investment 
efficiency amongst small- and medium-sized enterprises in 90 developing and transition 
economies. 
Here, too, the change in an expenditure-side parameter has an indirect effect on 
growth via the revenue side of the government budget constraint. Note that the link 
between higher corruption, higher inflation and lower growth remains as before; here, 
due to lower effective public spending (due to higher λ) being financed by seigniorage.  
To offer some examples, and further confirm the findings outlined in Proposition 
1, we conduct a series of numerical simulations. The goal is to illustrate the effects of 
corruption on the fiscal instruments and economic growth by setting plausible parameter 
values for the exogenous variables so as to generate realistic income tax and growth rates. 
Table 1 presents the benchmark values of the exogenous variables that determine the size 
of the endogenous variables. The values of the exogenous parameters are in line with the 
cited studies in the last column, while the corruption parameters reflect plausible values. 
As it concerns the endogenous variables, in the benchmark framework financial 
intermediaries hold only 14.5% of their deposits in the form of capital despite the much 
higher rate of return on this asset (26.5%) compared to money (3%). This result is 
sensible, however, given the relatively high relocation probability agents are facing 
(55%). The government uses 20% of national income toward public spending, while the 
income tax rate is determined at 26.8%. Finally, the economy grows at a rate of 4.26%. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows how the endogenous variables of interest vary in 
response to changes in the corruption parameters when the inflation rate is the only fiscal 
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instrument that is allowed to change. The main message, in line with Proposition 1, is that 
the inflation rate rises (lower R) and the equilibrium growth rate declines due to higher 
occurrence of corruption of any type (lower η, or higher χ or λ). So, in response to higher 
corruption, there needs to be a rise in seigniorage revenue via the inflation tax (in the 
absence of the income tax instrument) in order to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. The size of the change in the endogenous variables, however, varies across the 
types of corruption with both inflation and growth being most sensitive to corruption 
associated with the collection of public revenue, η. 
 
3.2. Income tax as the single source of variation in government revenue 
Although this too, is an extreme case, it is the limiting case of maintaining a very low rate 
of inflation. This is the experience of many developed countries, like the US and UK, and 
members of the European Union which have quite independent central banks with a 
commitment to maintain inflation within a specified target--as we know there is a strong 
positive relation between inflation and seigniorage (see Cukierman et al. (1992)). Very 
low reliance on the inflation-tax as a source of revenue could be expected from 
governments abandoning a regime of financial repression of the sort described by 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
24
 
 Within our model, this case corresponds to setting changes in the rate of inflation 
equal to zero in equation (13’). This, in turn, implies that any changes in spending are 
matched by changes in the tax rate. Using this condition, the new matrix form expression 
for the set of equations (11’) and (13’) appears in Appendix A(II). This Appendix also 
presents the comparative static exercises as to the effect of the three types of corruption 
on the income tax and growth rates. Once again, we present the findings of these 
experiments in the form of the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and a constant inflation rate 
(dR = 0), an increase in corruption related with the (i) collection of tax revenue, (ii) 
                                               
24 From a policy perspective, the World Bank (1989) has stressed the importance of reducing permanently 
the need for seigniorage revenues. 
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procurement of public goods, or (iii) productivity of public goods, increases the income 
tax rate and decreases the steady-state growth rate. 
 
Part (i) is a straightforward result stating that if corruption causes income tax 
revenue to drop, in the absence of an alternative method of raising revenue, the 
government has no other option but to increase the income tax rate in order to generate 
revenue to match the revenue lost due to corruption.
25
 As a result, the increase in the rate 
of income tax leads to a lower growth rate by diminishing the after tax income available 
for investment purposes. 
Part (ii) reflects an effect of corruption on growth through changes in both the 
level and the productivity of public spending. Intuitively, an increase in χ raises the size 
of government spending. At the same time, however, it decreases the productivity of 
output, b, and therefore the income tax base, which would have caused seigniorage 
revenue to rise (via a shift from income taxation). But given the constant inflation rate, 
the income tax rate has to rise in equilibrium to maintain the government budget 
constraint. Then, together with the fall in b, the growth rate falls.  



























− , (14) 
shows that an increase in corruption associated with a lower output productivity of public 
goods, b, causes both the revenue and expenditure elements of the government budget to 
decline. It is unclear, however, which element of the budget will decrease by a greater 
extent. If the decline in expenditure falls below (exceeds) the drop in revenue, then given 
a fixed inflation rate, this will induce a higher (lower) income tax rate to ensure a 
balanced budget. Our calculations show that the tax rate is actually higher as a result of 
the rise in λ, which implies, therefore, that the decline in spending is lower than the 
reduction in revenue. This finding, then, is consistent with a direct negative effect of 
                                               
25 De Gregorio (1993), in a model without corruption, shows that if the government is able to collect a 
smaller fraction of tax revenues (reflecting a more inefficient tax system), the tax rate has to increase when 
the rate of money creation is zero. 
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corruption on growth through a decline in the productivity (b) of the public good, and a 
complementary negative effect via a higher income tax rate (τ).  
We assess numerically the findings of Proposition 2 by changing the values of the 
corruption parameters one at a time and by allowing only the income tax rate to vary. The 
results appear in Panel B of Table 2, where a higher tax rate and a lower growth rate 
result in response to higher corruption. So, in response to higher corruption, there needs 
to be a rise in tax revenue via the income tax instrument (in the absence of seigniorage 
revenue) in order to satisfy the government budget constraint. This is true for any form of 
corruption, although the impact is, as in Proposition 1, greater in magnitude for corrupt 
tax collectors (lower η). Overall, the estimates in Panel B confirm Proposition 2.  
In sum, by putting together the findings of Proposition 1 and 2,  the implication is 
that both of the government revenue-creation instruments have to rise due to corruption 
and that their subsequent effects on growth are negative, regardless of the type of 
corruption taking place. This is also the implication drawn from the numerical 
simulations in Panels A and B of Table 2.  Thus, our framework suggests that corruption 
(of every type) influences a government’s revenue instruments in the same direction 
while, at the same time, diminishes economic growth. 
 
3.3. Adjustments in public expenditure 
We now examine the case where the government keeps its sources of revenue constant 
(both the tax rate and rate of inflation) and allows only exogenous adjustments in 
spending. Thus, the effects of corruption are now transmitted through the expenditure 
side of the government budget constraint. Appendix A(III) illustrates how equations 
(11’) and (13’) look in matrix form under such a restriction. The impact of the different 
forms of corruption on the share of government expenditure (as fraction of GDP) and on 
economic growth, is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: Given a constant income tax rate (dτ = 0) and a constant inflation rate 
(dR = 0), an increase in corruption related with the (i) collection of tax revenue, (ii) 
procurement of public goods, or (iii) productivity of public goods, has an ambiguous 
effect on both the share of government expenditure and the steady-state growth rate. 
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 The intuition of these outcomes is best illustrated with the use of equation (14), 
and resembles the explanations given for Proposition 2(ii). Specifically, a decrease in η 
decreases the revenue side in equation (14). The question now is: in which direction shall 
θ move to equilibrate the budget? Keeping in mind that output productivity, b, is 
positively influenced by changes in θ, we have a number of plausible outcomes. On the 
one hand, θ can increase, so that along with the increase in b, the expenditure side in 
equation (14) rises. But the rise in b will also increase the revenue side, so that if the rise 
in b exceeds the decline in η, a balanced budget is possible. Alternatively, θ can decline 
in response to a drop in η so that both sides of the budget will go down until a new 
equilibrium is achieved, assuming that the spending side will decrease by more. 
Moreover, the change in θ causes a change in the growth rate of output in the same 
direction through its impact on productivity. Thus, it is unclear in which way θ will adjust 
due to higher corruption on the collection of taxes, leading to ambiguous growth effects. 
 An increase in corruption related with the procurement of public goods, χ, leads to 
a decline in b so that the revenue side of equation (14) declines, while total expenditure 
may either fall or rise. If expenditures rise, then for a balanced budget, θ needs to drop, 
which will further reduce b. The double drop in b, due to the original increase in χ and the 
subsequent decreases in θ, diminishes the rate of growth. If, on the other hand, spending 
goes down by more than revenue, then for a balanced budget, θ will rise. This, in turn, 
will drive up both sides of the constraint. In this case, the offsetting effect of a higher χ 
and higher θ on productivity will have an ambiguous effect on growth. As before, this 
type of corruption also has unclear implications for the share of government spending and 
output growth. 
 Finally, an increase in λ, by decreasing output productivity, causes both sides of 
the budget to decline. But it is not identifiable which of the sides will decrease by more. 
If spending declines by more (less), then θ needs to rise (decline) to rebalance the budget. 
Once again, therefore, the impact of corruption is generally ambiguous. However, the 
general ambiguity of the effect of all types of corruption on both government spending 
and long-run growth can be identified as being related to a single variable: the size of 
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public expenditure relative to the size of the economy, g/y. The following corollary 
illustrates this. 
 
Corollary 3.1: Given a constant income tax rate (dτ = 0) and a constant inflation rate 
(dR = 0), if the share of government expenditure as a fraction of total economic activity 
is relatively large (small), an increase in corruption related with the (i) collection of tax 
revenue, (ii) procurement of public goods, or (iii) productivity of public goods, decreases 
(raises) both the share of public expenditure and the steady-state growth rate. 
 
 The exact expression of the threshold value of government spending-to-output 
appears at the end of Appendix A(III). If g/y is relatively large, a decrease in η which 
decreases the revenue side in equation (14), calls for a decline in θ so that both sides of 
the constraint decrease. Given that g/y is large, the expenditure side will decrease by a 
greater amount to catch up with the initial decline in revenue due to corruption, and, thus, 
equilibrate the budget. The drop in θ leads to a lower steady-state growth rate of output. 
In a similar way, with a large government size, increases in χ and λ require a decline in θ 
for a balanced budget to be retained, followed by lower output growth. The increase in χ 
decreases the revenue side of equation (14), while the large and increasing size of 
θχε )1( +  leads to greater expenses, even with a lower b. To restore budget equilibrium, 
a downward adjustment of θ is needed. Finally, an increase in λ, even though causes both 
sides of the budget to decline, with a large government size, revenue declines by more. 
This, in turn, calls for lower θ. In sum, higher corruption in the presence of a large 
(small) government, leads to a downward (an upward) adjustment of the entire budget 
constraint and, thus, of public expenditure. This, in turn, reduces (raises) productivity and 
economic growth. This inverted-U curve type of effect implies that an optimal size of 
government can, in principle, be identified. 
 Proposition 3 is put to the test with numerical simulations. Panel C of Table 2 
illustrates the effects of corruption on the share of public spending and on economic 
growth, when public spending is the only fiscal instrument that is allowed to vary. The 
findings support Corollary 3.1 for the case where the share of public spending as fraction 
of total GDP is relatively large, in that both endogenous variables decline in response to 
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corruption. As in the previous propositions, the type of corruption that leads to greater 
declines in both θ and γ is that associated with corruption in the collection of tax 
proceeds. 
In general, these findings support the presence of non-linear effects of corruption 
on growth with the sign of the impact being contingent on the size of the government: 
corruption in an environment with a small government improves growth, while in a large 
government impedes growth. Even though the mechanism of transmission of these effects 
focuses purely on public spending considerations, other studies have unveiled conditional 
effects of corruption on growth by focusing on political institutional quality (Mendez and 
Sepulveda (2006), Meon and Sekkat (2005), and Aidt et al. (2008)). Studying interaction 
effects between corruption and government size in growth regressions could, therefore, 
be a worthwhile task. 
 
4. Corruption and growth with optimal (second-best) economic policy 
In the previous analysis, the role of the government has been “passive” in response to 
corruption, in the sense that its fiscal choices were determined by adjusting either the 
revenue or the expenditure side to ensure a balanced budget. This means that the 
government has not been choosing its instruments optimally in a way as to maximize 
some social welfare function. In this section, we examine whether the results obtained 
thus far in linking the key fiscal variables, corruption, and growth are robust to an 
approach that allows for the government to be “active” in its choices of fiscal 
instruments. 
 In this section, we endogenize economic policy as reflected by the optimal choice 
of the three fiscal instruments: θ*, τ*, and R*. We assume a benevolent government that 
plays a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector. This corresponds to the situation 
where agents make consumption-investment decisions by taking fiscal policy variables as 
given
 
and then the government chooses fiscal instruments taking the response functions 
of agents as given.
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 That is, the government maximizes the utility of the agents by 
                                               
26 An alternative approach would be to solve for the first-best (command-optimum) equilibrium where the 
benevolent government chooses the fiscal policy variables and consumption-investment decision rules at 
the same time. Aside from the fact that this approach is less realistic (since a government is unlikely to 
have control over private investment and consumption decisions), it should also be noted that the key 
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considering its own budget and the market allocation as constraints, the latter being 
summarized by the growth rate equation (11). We assume commitment technologies on 
behalf of the government, so that decisions cannot be altered.
27
 
 To characterize the second-best equilibrium we use as objective of the benevolent 
government the sum of lifetime utilities of all agents over generations discounted by a 








tUρ , (15) 
where tU  is the utility function given in equation (1). To ensure that Ω is bounded, we 
follow Barro (1990) in assuming 
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where the growth rate γ is described in equation (11) and 
[ ] [ ] 0),()1()],(1[),( 11 >∆−+∆−≡ −+−+ σσσσ β rRbqrRRqrRY . 
 
The term in square brackets of equation (15’) represents the agents’ income associated 
with legal practices, which is intermediated through financial corporations. This implies 
that social welfare depends only on the legal income of agents. The illegal income 
obtained through corrupt practices is not part of the government’s welfare function, 
because the government knows the distribution of agents indulging in corrupt practices 
(even though it does not know a particular agent’s type). Thus, the government abstracts 
                                                                                                                                            
feature of our model is the existence of three different forms of corruption, which are exogenously given. 
Given that corruption is undetectable in our framework, a benevolent government has to choose its 
instruments appropriately while acknowledging that corruption does and will exist in equilibrium. In this 
context, the concept of an omniscient social planner that ‘internalizes’ corruption is difficult to fathom, and 
we therefore abstract from considerations of how a decentralized economy could replicate the social 
optimum (as, for example, could be studied when the services from public goods are affected by 
congestion), and focus on the government’s second-best policy, which is termed the ‘optimal’ policy. 
27 Recent applications of this problem can be found in Park and Philippopoulos (2002), Espinosa-Vega and 
Yip (1999, 2002), and Chen (2006). 
28 We follow the conventional practice of ignoring the initial old people’s utility in the evaluation of social 
welfare. 
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entirely from the consideration of illegal income as part of its welfare function, revealing 
its aversion to illegitimate practices that allow corrupt bureaucrats to profit. Given the 
exogenous nature of corruption (in the aggregate), however, the government has to 
choose its fiscal instruments while acknowledging the distortions imposed by the 
presence of corrupt practices in attaining the second-best.  
Solving the benevolent government’s optimization problem, which amounts to 
maximizing equation (15’) subject to equations (11) and (13) with respect to the three 
fiscal policy instruments (θ*, τ*, R*), it is established that the welfare-maximizing fiscal 
structure is determined by  
0),,,,,,,,,,,*;*,*,(1 =λχηρεµξβασθτ qARJ , (16) 
0),,,,,,,,,,,*;*,*,(2 =λχηρεµξβασθτ qARJ , (17) 
where the functions (.)1J  and (.)2J  are defined in Appendix B. These two functions, 
along with the government budget constraint, are used to solve for (θ*, τ*, R*). In 
general, these being higher order polynomials, it is not possible to solve for the optimal 
budget instruments explicitly. For this reason, we resort to numerical simulations to solve 
for θ*, τ*, R*, and in the process, also provide solutions to the rest of the endogenous 
variables – b, r, δ, and γ – with the use of equations (2’), (4), (10), and (11). 
Using the values for the exogenous variables as listed earlier in Table 1, and 
choosing a value of 0.03 for the social welfare discount factor (ρ), Table 3 presents the 
estimated values for the endogenous variables. A notable observation is that the size of 
all these variables is greater compared to their counterparts in Table 1 obtained under the 
decentralized equilibrium, except for the income tax rate which is lower. In particular, the 
government optimally taxes income at a rate of 10.05% and deflates prices at a gross rate 
of 3.88%, with the combined collected revenue from income taxation and seigniorage 
being used to finance public sector wages and 21.89% of national income toward (net of 
corruption) productive public spending. Compared to the decentralized equilibrium, the 
larger value of R, despite implying a higher rate of return on money holdings, leads 
financial intermediaries to hold a larger share of their deposits in the form of capital 
assets. The higher value of δ, in turn, along with the higher value of the output 
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productivity of private capital, b, and the lower income tax rate, τ, give rise to an 
economic growth rate γ of 8.64%. 
These findings suggest that the government in maximizing welfare optimally 
selects a high inflation tax rate, which yields high revenue from seigniorage despite the 
lower inflation tax base, thus having to rely less on income taxation to sustain the 
financing of government expenditure. In essence, therefore, the government is trading off 
higher inflation taxes with lower income taxes. Thus, from a welfare perspective, the 
optimal policy represents an expansion of the money supply with a simultaneous 
contraction of the income tax rate. 
Given our interest (i) in the effects of corruption on the fiscal instruments and on 
economic growth, and (ii) on whether these effects differ when the government is ‘active’ 
compared to ‘passive’ in its choice of these instruments, Table 4 presents comparative 
statics exercises that resemble in spirit to those performed in Table 2. That is, we track 
the behaviour of the policy variables and of economic growth once we allow each of the 
corruption parameters to change one at a time. But, unlike Table 2, and in order to 
capture the second-best, now all policy instruments are allowed to adjust simultaneously 
from their benchmark values in response to changes in corruption.  
The simulations support two main results. First, every type of corruption leads the 
government to optimally reduce the level of productive spending and raise the income tax 
rate, while the rate of deflation declines in two of the three cases. In each case, the 
combined effect of these adjustments causes a lower growth rate of output, γ. Second, and 
most importantly, changes in the optimal fiscal instruments are in the same direction as 
those obtained in Table 2, under the government’s ‘passive’ policy; the sole exception is 
the rise of R in response to a change in χ.
29
 
With regard to the first finding, the government by being constrained in running a 
balanced budget in each period adjusts all its fiscal instruments, so as to increase its 
revenue and simultaneously decrease its expenditure, when corruption takes place. In this 
way, it tries to smooth out the effect of each form of corruption on all its instruments by 
minimizing their distortion to welfare. At the same time, these adjustments lead to lower 
                                               
29 All these comparative statics results are strongly confirmed via various sensitivity tests that use different 
changes in the magnitude of the corruption parameters. These alternative comparative statics are available 
upon request. 
 31
economic growth, as would be expected. For example, starting from an initial 
equilibrium, a decrease in η implies that a higher proportion of tax revenue is 
appropriated by corrupt bureaucrats, which forces the government to bring about a higher 
income tax rate and decrease both the optimal share of public expenditure and the optimal 
rate of return on holding money (i.e., higher inflation tax). These, in turn, lead to a 
decrease in both the growth rate and welfare.  
The second main finding implies that a government that acts in such a way as to 
optimally choose its fiscal instruments in the presence of corruption leads to fiscal and 
economic changes that are in line with those under a government that adjusts its fiscal 
choices to run a balanced budget. Therefore, in connection with the growth and welfare 
effects of corruption, our findings show that it may not be critical whether the 
government takes a passive or an active stance in setting its fiscal variables in response to 
corruption. The qualitative similarity of the results under the two regimes underlines the 
robustness of the outcomes to different fiscal experiments in the presence of corruption. 
Although the implications for corruption on the growth rate are almost uniformly 
negative, our study shows how an optimising government could seek to prioritise its 
resources to reduce the types of corruption that harm growth more than others. For 
instance, in the context of tax revenue collection, the government could consider reforms 
in tax enforcement, which may include a bonus to the tax officer based on the amount of 
taxes he or she collects. This has been shown to bring about significant improvements in 





We observed at the outset the World Bank perception of corruption as a genuine threat to 
the efficient functioning of (mainly developing) economies, and its steely resolve to fight 
this evil by designing corruption-free institutions. Given the paramount importance of 
this issue, and given that a large proportion of corruption occurs through the public 
finances, we attempted to identify the various forms of bureaucratic corruption that are in 
existence, and the responses of a benevolent government in dealing with the same. More 
                                               
30 For an excellent analysis, and survey of the literature on incentives towards public officials, see Tirole 
(1994). 
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specifically, this paper studied, via a unified analytical framework, the effects of 
corruption on an economy’s growth rate, and on the policy instruments (income tax rate, 
inflation rate, and size of government spending) that are employed when bureaucratic 
corruption takes three forms: it reduces the tax revenues that are raised from households, 
inflates the volume of government spending, and reduces the productivity of effective 
government expenditure. Moreover, our analysis has distinguished between the case 
where fiscal choices are effectively determined exogenously through the balanced budget 
constraint, and the case where the government sets its instruments in an optimal manner 
to achieve the second-best policy outcome.   
 The effects of corruption on fiscal policy variables as well as growth are intuitive. 
Corruption reduces growth via higher income tax and inflation rates, and a lower level of 
government spending. Importantly, these transmission effects are valid and qualitatively 
similar under both a passive and an active stance by the government, which points to the 
robustness of our results. In this context, an optimising government would be able to 
identify the sources of corruption that have the most negative effects on an economy, and 
perhaps provide appropriate incentives to mitigate such corruption.  
There is only one instance of corruption having a positive growth effect, and this 
is in the context of a government passively adjusting its level of expenditure in response 
to corruption. This result, however, depends on the size of the government, which needs 
to be relatively small to start with. If, on the other hand, the government is relatively 
large, corruption has a distorting growth effect. The nature of all these effects has not 
hitherto been explored in the literature. Moreover, our analysis - by combining the 
literature on corruption in public spending and finances with that on fiscal policy and 
growth - has established some results that could rationalise some of the findings in the 
earlier literature in the area. 
Our research could be extended in different directions. One line of enquiry, which 
is outside the scope of the current exercise, would be to endogenize corruption by 
allowing a feedback effect from growth to corrupt activities. Indeed, some studies 
(Paldam (2002), Blackburn et al. (2006)) have suggested mechanisms via which such 
feedback is plausible. Such analysis would determine an equilibrium level of corruption 
and examine whether growth has different effects on the rewards to honesty and to 
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corruption. Another area in which our research could be conducted would be to 
empirically estimate the effects of the different types of corruption in public expenditure 
and revenue on growth. This would supplement the work of Blackburn et al. (2010) on 
corruption on the revenue side of the government budget constraint. A third direction in 
which our research could be extended is to study the case where bond financing (rather 
than money financing) of deficits – along with tax financing – is considered feasible. This 
would be an interesting exercise in the context of countries where corruption is rife, and 
which operate under the Stability and Growth Pact, that assigns upper limits to deficits 
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Under the assumptions of 0=θd  and 0dτ = , the matrix form expression of equations 



















































































































































In obtaining the signs of a14, a15, a24, and a25, we have used equation (4) and the 
expression of b from the output per capita equation (2’), from where it can be shown that 
0/ <∂∂ χb  and 0/ <∂∂ λb . 
 
Using equation (A1), we can derive the inflation and growth effects of a change in 


















Using equation (A1) again, we can derive the inflation and growth effects of a change in 














Finally, using equation (A1) we can derive the inflation and growth effects of a change in 
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Using equation (A9) along with the expressions for aij defined above into the pairs of 
equations (A2)-(A3), (A4)-(A5), and (A6)-(A7) respectively, we obtain that 0/ >ηddR , 
0/ >ηγ dd , 0/ <χddR , 0/ <χγ dd , 0/ <λddR , and 0/ <λγ dd , which form the 





Under the assumptions of 0=θd  and 0=dR , the new matrix form expression for the set 
of equations (11’) and (13’) now is  
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Using equation (A10), we can derive the income tax rate and growth effects of a change 
in corruption related with the collection of tax revenues; that is, of a lower η. These are 
11 23 21 13
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where ‘DET’ is the determinant, for which the expression is provided in equation (A17) 
below. 
 
Using equation (A10) again, we can derive the income tax rate and growth effects of a 
change in corruption related with the procurement of public goods; that is, of a higher χ. 
These are 
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Finally, using equation (A10) we can derive the income tax rate and growth effects of a 
change in corruption related with the productivity of public goods; that is, of a higher λ, 
as  
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= , (A15) 
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In equations (A11)-(A16) the determinant is given by
31
 
012212212211 >−∆+==−= ηbbbbbDET . (A17) 
Using equation (A17) along with the expressions for bij defined above into the pairs of 
equations (A11)-(A12), (A13)-(A14), and (A15)-(A16) respectively, we obtain that 
                                               
31 The positive sign of the determinant is proved in Appendix B below. 
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0/ <ητ dd , 0/ >ηγ dd , 0/ >χτ dd , 0/ <χγ dd , 0/ >λτ dd , and 0/ <λγ dd , which 





Using the restrictions that 0=τd  and 0=dR , the new matrix form expression for the set 





















































































Using equation (A18), we can derive the effects of a change in corruption associated with 






















where ‘Det’’ is the determinant, for which the expression is provided in equation (A25) 
below. 
 
Using equation (A18) again, we can derive the effects of a change in corruption 
associated with the procurement of public goods (a higher χ) on government expenditure 





















Finally, using equation (A18) we can derive the effects of a change in corruption 
associated with the productivity of public goods (a higher λ) on government expenditure 
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Multiplying and dividing through equation (A25) by θ, and using equations (2’), (5) and 
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the sign of which is in general ambiguous. The sign depends on the relative size of total 
spending on public goods and services (as a fraction of GDP). If this ratio is large, then 
Det’ < 0 and the effects captured by equations (A19)-(A24) can be assigned the following 
signs: 0/ >ηθ dd , 0/ >ηγ dd , 0/ <χθ dd , 0/ <χγ dd , 0/ <λθ dd , and 0/ <λγ dd . 






The economy is populated by two types of agents, households and bureaucrats, of which 
bureaucrats are divided into those that oversee the collection of tax revenue and those that 
deal with the procurement of the public good. In these two classes of bureaucrats, there 
are in place both honest and corrupt public officials. This description of the structure of 
our economy shows that there is no such thing as one representative agent. Therefore, 
when the benevolent government is deriving the welfare criterion, Ω in equation (15), it 
takes into account the discounted lifetime utility of all agents. Given that utility is solely 
based on consumption during the second period of the agents’ lives, the appropriate 
measure of welfare is a function of the total level of consumption in the economy during 
the agents’ lifetime. 
 
The income of households and the legal income of bureaucrats are saved with the 
financial intermediaries, while the illegal income of bureaucrats is saved “under the 
mattress.” This means that only the income saved through banks is subject to an uncertain 
rate of return conditional on the probability of the agent’s relocation. The illegal income, 
on the other hand, carries no rate of return. This latter income is represented by the total 
amount appropriated by corrupt bureaucrats: ])1)[(1( tt yw χεθτηµ +−− . This illegal 
income, however, is not included in the government’s social welfare function given that 
the government knows the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats, and thus the size of their 
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income. In other words, the government considers in its welfare function only 
consumption that arises from legal income. 
 








tUρ , (B1) 
where 
















subject to the economic growth rate equation (11) and the government budget constraint 









































Using equations (2’), (3), (4), (8), and (9) into equation (B2), the latter becomes 
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Using equation (B2’) and the growth rate equation (B3), some algebra reveals that 
equation (B1) becomes equation (15’), or 
                                               
32 Tedious calculations reveal that   
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Solving for the benevolent government’s optimization problem, which amounts to 
maximizing equation (B5) subject to equations (B3) and (B4) with respect to the three 
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint and 
R∂∆∂ /  and RY ∂∂ / are as defined in the text.33 
 
























































































































































































while combining equations (B6) and (B8), yields 
                                               
33 Given the restriction 
σγρ < , equation (B6) implies that 01 <−∆− η . This, in turn, proves the positive 






















































































These two reduced optimality conditions, (B9) and (B10), which define the two implicit 
functions (.)1J  and (.)2J  in the text, along with the government budget constraint (13), 
are used to solve for the three (second-best) optimal fiscal instruments, θ*, τ*, and R*. 
These expressions, however, are highly non-linear, and as a result explicit solutions for 
the optimal fiscal instruments, and of the effects of corruption, cannot be obtained. For 
this reason, we rely on numerical simulations, as discussed in the text. 
Table 1 
Benchmark Parameters 






σ , where IES is the 
intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. 
Bose et al. (2007) 
A 2 Firm’s total factor productivity Bose et al. (2007) 
α 0.67 Elasticity of output with respect to 
labour 
Bose et al. (2007) 
β 0.55 Elasticity of output with respect to 
private capital 
Baxter and King (1993) 
ξ 0.7 Public goods productivity in firm’s 
output 
Baxter and King (1993) 
q 0.55 Probability of agent relocation in 
second period of life 
Bose et al. (2007) 
ρ 0.03 Social welfare discount factor Holman and Neanidis 
(2006) 
µ 0.8 Share of households in economy Author’s calculations 
based on the share of 
private sector 
employment to total 
employment for 66 
countries, average over 
years 2009 and 2010; 
Employment Statistics, 
ILO. 
ε 0.025 Size of public spending inflated 
due to corruption 
Author’s set value 
    
Corruption variables    
η 0.95 Proportion of non-corrupt 
bureaucrats in charge of public 
revenue collection 
 
χ 0.25 Proportion of corrupt bureaucrats 
in charge of public good 
procurement 
 
λ 0.5 Productivity loss of public 




    
Endogenous variables    
r 0.2652 Real rate of return on capital 
holdings (MPK) 
 
b 0.4821 Linear output productivity of 
private capital 
 
δ 0.1442 Fraction of bank deposits lent to 
firms 
 
R 0.03 Real rate of return on money 
holdings 
 
τ 0.2683 Income (wage) tax rate  
θ 0.2 Proportion of output toward public 
goods expenditure 
 









Comparative Statics Exercises of Passive Government Policy 
 θ τ R  γ 
Benchmark values 0.2 0.2683 0.03 0.0426 
     
Panel A: Proposition 1     
η: 0.95 → 0.9 0.2 0.2683 0.0268 0.0390 
χ: 0.25 → 0.3 0.2 0.2683 0.0292 0.0415 
λ: 0.5 → 0.55 0.2 0.2683 0.0296 0.0421 
     
Panel B: Proposition 2     
η: 0.95 → 0.9 0.2 0.5715 0.03 0.0249 
χ: 0.25 → 0.3 0.2 0.3014 0.03 0.0404 
λ: 0.5 → 0.55 0.2 0.2834 0.03 0.0416 
     
Panel C: Proposition 3     
η: 0.95 → 0.9 0.1798 0.2683 0.03 0.0417 
χ: 0.25 → 0.3 0.1953 0.2683 0.03 0.0422 
λ: 0.5 → 0.55 0.1979 0.2683 0.03 0.0424 
     


































Values of Endogenous Variables under Active Government Policy 
Endogenous variables Value Definition 
r 0.2855 Real rate of return on capital 
holdings (MPK) 
b 0.5191 Linear output productivity of 
private capital 
δ 0.2362 Fraction of bank deposits lent to 
firms 
R* 0.0388 Real rate of return on money 
holdings 
τ* 0.1005 Income (wage) tax rate 
θ* 0.2189 Proportion of output toward public 
goods expenditure 











Comparative Statics Exercises of Active Government Policy 
 θ* τ* R* γ 
Benchmark values 0. 2189 0. 1005 0.0388 0. 0864 
     
Corruption type     
η: 0.95 → 0.9 0.1682 0.1571 0.0371 0.0667 
χ: 0.25 → 0.3 0.1383 0.6014 0.0490 0.0288 
λ: 0.5 → 0.55 0.2178 0.1248 0.0377 0.0839 
     
Note: Values in Italics represent the endogenous variables allowed to change in response to higher 
corruption. 
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